Richard W. Miller v. Sheryl Rae (Miller) Martecorena and Sergio A. Marticorena : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Richard W. Miller v. Sheryl Rae (Miller)
Martecorena and Sergio A. Marticorena : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brant H Wall; Gregory B Wall; Attorneys for Respondent.
Robert D Maack; Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss, Campbell and Cowley; Attorney for Third-Party
Defendant-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Richard W. Miller v. Sheryl Rae (Miller) Martecorena and Sergio A. Marticorena, No. 13629.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/811
U / ^ ' 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
IN THE SUPREME CqiJRT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MSIMA YOUNG UNIVERSITY: 
.. iieuben Clark Law School 
RICHARD W. MILLER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SHERYL RAE (MILLER) \ Case No. 
MARTICORENA, Defendant,! 13629 
and 
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA, 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, j 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Decree and Order of 
the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, District Judge, Presidinf 
ROBERT D. MAACK, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss. 
Campbell & Cowley 
BRANT H. WALL, ESQ. Suite 400, 315 East Second South 
GREGORY B. WALL, ESQ. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys at Law Attorney for Third-Party 
530 Judge Building Defendant-Appellant . ^ &>*»> 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 4 | 1 
Attor#eys for Plaintiff-Respondent ., ., * » 8** 1 J 
T fi 1« —^ ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON APPEAL ... 
STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H E NATURAL PARENT HAS T H E 
PRIMARY, SUPREME AND PARA-
MOUNT RIGHT AGAINST ALL T H E 
WORLD TO REAR AND NURTURE H I S 
OWN NATURAL OFFSPRING 
POINT I I 
T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO RECEIVE, ADMIT AND CON-
SIDER VIRTUALLY EVERY ITEM OF 
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT TO PROVE H I S 
CASE 
1. The trial court erred in excluding testimony 
by Dr. Donald M. Kirk, M.D. with respect to 








Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
2. Testimony offered by the second husband and 
third-party defendant Marticorena regarding 
the period of time during which he lived in 
cohabitation with the child's mother prior to 
and at the time of her conception and preg-
nancy was improperly excluded as being too 
remote 16 
3. The trial court erred in refusing to allow ap-
pellant's counsel to examine the plaintiff, Mil-
ler, regarding his own knowledge and of state-
ments by the child's mother with respect to pa-
ternity 17 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to admit 
written documents in the mother's own hand-
writing declaring the appellant to be the true 
father of the child 20 
5. The court erred in excluding from considera-
tion the fact that the appellant Marticorena 
paid the doctor and hospital bills for the birth 
of the child 23 
6. The trial court erred in refusing to admit or 
consider corroborating statements made by 
Sheryl Rae to Marticorena, Miller, Dr. Kirk, 
Dr. Kirk's nurse, and Bishop Robert Meyer 
concerning the true paternity of the child 24 
Summary 26 
POINT III 
LORD M A N S F I E L D ' S R U L E H A S NO 
A P P L I C A T I O N TO T H E CASE A T BAR „ 28 
1. The child cannot possibly be illegitimatized .. 28 
2. The policy reasons for Lord Mansfield's rule 
do not apply to the mother's testimony 30 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P O I N T IV Page 
T H E H E A R I N G B E F O R E T H E T R I A L 
COURT ON P L A I N T I F F ' S O R D E R TO 
S H O W CAUSE W A S F U N D A M E N T -
A L L Y A N D I N H E R E N T L Y U N F A I R , 
U N J U S T A N D I N E Q U I T A B L E , D I D NOT 
DO S U B S T A N T I A L J U S T I C E A N D D E -
P R I V E D T H E A P P E L L A N T O F T H E 
D U E PROCESS A N D E Q U A L PRO-
T E C T I O N O F T H E L A W 31 
P O I N T V 
I N D E P E N D E N T S C I E N T I F I C E V I D -
E N C E E X I S T S A N D IS A V A I L A B L E TO 
A I D T H E COURT I N E S T A B L I S H I N G 
T R U E P A T E R N I T Y A N D T H E A P P E L -
L A N T R E Q U E S T S T H E COURT'S IM-
P R I M A T U R E ON T H E P O I N T 34 
CONCLUSION 35 
CASES C I T E D 
Almeida v. Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 
465 P.2d 564 (1970) 13, 14, 35 
Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 
429 P.2d 35 (1967) 30 
Combs v. Hodge, 21 How. (U.S.) 397, 
16 L.Ed. 115 13 
Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal. App. 2d 15, 
122 P.2d 308 (1942) 16 
Hill v. Hill, 202 Okl. 483, 215 P.2d 553 (1949) .... 19 
Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 
350 P.2d 761 (1959) 16 
lit 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
In Re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 
261 Pac. 15 (1927) 18 
In Re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 
86 Pac. 757 (1906) 30 
In Re Lewis Estate, 121 Utah 385, 
242 P.2d 565 (1952) 12, 21, 29 
Johnson v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 
420 P.2d 615 (1966) 35 
Leemhuis v. Leemhuis, 137 Cal. App. 2d 117, 
289 P.2d 852 (1955) 19 
Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 
518 P.2d 687 (1974) 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36 
Miller v. Miller, Docket 2993 (R. 1) 14 
Nulman v. Cooper, 120 Colo. 98, 
207 P.2d 814 (1949) 13 
People in the Interest of S., 
514P.2d772 (Colo. 1973) 35 
Sedam v. United States, 116 F.2d 80 
(10th Cir., Utah 1940) 15 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Insurance Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 
384 P.2d 109 (1963) 34 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 
1208, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972) 9 
State of Kansas v. Mulum, 202 Kan. 196, 
447 P.2d 801 (1968) 22 
State Road Commission v. Thompson, 17 Utah 2d 
412, 413 P.2d 604 (1966) 15 
State of Utah in the Interests of M., 25 Utah 
2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970) 9 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
State of Utah v. Abram, 27 Utah 2d 266, 
495 P.2d 313 (1972) 22, 23 
State v. Chaffin, 92 Idaho 629, 
448 P.2d 243 (1968) 19 
State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 
175 P.2d 724 (1946) 18 
State v. Thorne, 43 Wash. 2d 47, 
260 P.2d 331 (1953) 19 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 
384 P.2d 109 (1963) 34 
Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 
187 P.2d 1018 (1947) 19 
Utah v. Anderson, 63 Utah 121, 
224 Pac. 442, 40 A L R 94 (1924) 35 
Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 1551 56 Am. Dec. 451 17 
S T A T U T E S C I T E D 
77-60-14, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 29 
78-24-8(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 18 
78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 29, 30 
R U L E S C I T E D 
Rule 75(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 
Rule 76(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Evidenve 31 
Rule 28, Utah Rules of Evidence 18, 19 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence 15, 27 
Rule 63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence 15 
Rules 63 (24), Utah Rules of Evidence .... 12, 15, 21, 26 
Rule 70, Utah Rules of Evidence 21 
SECONDARY A U T H O R I T Y 
9 A L R 985 23 
14 A L R 64, Admissibility Against Stranger To 
Proceeding In Which Pleading Is Filed 13 
37 A L R 2d 882 Annotation, Illegitimate Child 
Bight To Custody 9 
45 A L R 3d 216, 227, §4 (b), Right of Putative 
Father To Custody of Illegitimate Child 9 
55 A L R 3d 1087 Annotation, Propriety of Exhibi-
tion of Child to Jury to Show Family Resemb-
lance, or Lack of It, on Issue of Paternity 35 
90 A L R 1402 13 
29 AM. JUR. , "Evidence," §473, 
Letters at p. 531 21 
5 Family Law Quarterly 252, Krause, Scientific 
Evidence, and the Ascertainment of 
Paternity (1971) 35 
3 Jones on Evidence §536 23 
vi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD W. MILLER, i 
Plaintiff-Respondent, \ 
vs. I 
SHERYL RAE (MILLER) \ Case No. 
MARTICORENA, Defendant,( 13629 
and I 
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA, / 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.' 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
This is an appeal by the third-party defendant, 
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA (second husband of 
the decedent) from a DECREE AND ORDER of 
the Family Courts Division of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, declaring the plaintiff, RICHARD W. MIL-
LER (first husband of the decedent) to be the nat-
1 
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ural father of the minor child Michael Wayne Miller, 
and awarding sole care, custody and control of said 
child to the plaintiff-respondent, M I L L E R . 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E T R I A L COURT 
On February 6, 1974, the plaintiff-respondent 
R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R and the third-party de-
fendant-appellant, SERGIO A. M A R T I C O R E N A , 
came before the Family Courts Division of the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Peter F . Leary, 
District Judge, presiding, pursuant to the plaintiff's 
MOTION A N D O R D E R TO S H O W CAUSE (R. 
11, 14), requiring the third-party defendant M A R T I -
CORENA to show cause why the minor child, Michael 
Wayne Miller, should not be delivered to the plaintiff 
M I L L E R , why sole care, custody and control of said 
child should not be permanently awarded to him, and 
why a previous Decree of Divorce (between the plain-
tiff R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R and the defendant 
S H E R Y L R A E M I L L E R (R. 9)) should not be 
modified accordingly. 
The Court conducted a brief hearing, received some 
evidence and heard some of the testimony as proffered 
by the parties, and at the close of the evidence, the 
Court ruled from the bench that the plaintiff was en-
titled to the relief he sought and ordered the third-
party defendant to deliver the child to the plaintiff, 
M I L L E R , awarded sole care, custody and control to 
the plaintiff, and modified the Decree of Divorce ac-
2 
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cordingly. From that Order the third-party defendant 
M A R T I C O R E N A respectfully appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, the appellant seeks equitable review, 
to have the Court review both the law and the facts, 
pursuant to Rule 75(a) U.R.C.P., vacate the Decree 
and Order made and entered by the District Court on 
February 6, 1974, and remand the case back to the 
trial court for a rehearing upon the merits. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E F A C T S 
1. On May 10, 1969, the plaintiff, R I C H A R D 
W. M I L L E R , and the defendant S H E R Y L R A E 
( M I L L E R ) M A R T I C O R E N A were married in 
Provo,Utah (R. 112). 
2. On May 22, 1969, R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R 
left the State of Utah and took up residence at Ft . 
Gordon, Georgia, pursuant to a six-month active duty 
assignment with the National Guard (R. 112). 
3. Approximately a week after M I L L E R ' s de-
parture for Georgia, S H E R Y L R A E left the State 
of Utah and moved to Glendale, California to visit 
with her father (R. 93). 
4. Sometime in the early summer of 1969 while 
living in California, S H E R Y L R A E became ac-
quainted with the third-party defendant, SERGIO A. 
M A R T I C O R E N A (R. 92, 93). 
5. S H E R Y L R A E and M A R T I C O R E N A be-
came romantically involved and eventually lived in co-
3 
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habitation together in California for several months 
during the summer of 1969 (approximately June, July 
and through most of August of 1969 (R. 92, 93). 
6. Sometime in the late summer of 1969, 
S H E R Y L R A E learned shat she was pregnant (R. 
99, 126) with the minor child who is the subject matter 
of this action, Michael Wayne Miller (R. 99, 126). 
She communicated this fact to several other individuals 
(R. 99,126). 
7. On or about the third week of August, 1969, 
the plaintiff R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R took emerg-
ency leave from the National Guard and traveled to 
California in order to locate the defendant S H E R Y L 
R A E M I L L E R (R. 113). 
8. During his visit in August, 1969, M I L L E R 
was successful in persuading the defendant S H E R Y L 
R A E to leave M A R T I C O R E N A and return to the 
State of Utah. 
9. M I L L E R remained in California for only three 
days and then returned to Georgia to complete his tour 
of active duty, whereupon the defendant, S H E R Y L 
R A E , returned to the State of Utah (R. 115, 116). 
10. On approximately August 16 and September 
2, 1969, S H E R Y L R A E consulted the Salt Lake 
City physician, Dr. Donald M. Kirk, who confirmed 
that she was in fact pregnant (R. 126). 
11. On October 17, 1969, the plaintiff, R I C H -
A R D W. M I L L E R , completed his six-month tour 
4 
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of active duty with the National Guard, and on Oc-
tober 18, 1969, returned to Salt Lake City and took 
up residence with S H E R Y L R A E (R. 116). 
12. On May 26, 1970, the minor child, Michael 
Wayne Miller, was born in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 
112). 
13. The plaintiff, R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R , 
and the defendant S H E R Y L R A E ( M I L L E R ) 
continued to live together for approximately six months 
after the birth of the child, and then separated (R. 
120). 
14. After the separation of R I C H A R D M I L L -
E R and S H E R Y L R A E , S H E R Y L began to cor-
respond with M A R T I C O R E N A in California and 
sent to him certain letters in her own handwriting (Ex-
hibit D - l ) , explaining her reasons for leaving Cali-*-
fornia and discussing the paternity of the child (R. 
99,100,101). 
15. In the early part of November, 1970, 
S H E R Y L R A E moved back to California and again 
took up residence with MARTICORENA. 
16. On December 31, 1970, the plaintiff R I C H -
A R D W. M I L L E R filed his Petition for Divorce 
(R. 1) ; the defendant S H E R Y L R A E ( M I L L E R ) 
did not contest the action and on December 30, 1970, 
signed and later filed with the Court her Appearance 
and Waiver and Consent to Default (R. 5). 
17. In March of 1972, a Decree of Divorce was 
entered granting the divorce to the plaintiff R I C H -
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A R D W. M I L L E R ; on June 30, 1972, the divorce 
became final and absolute (R. 4). 
18. On July 30, 1972, the defendant S H E R Y L 
R A E and the third-party defendant S E R G I O A. 
M A R T I C O R E N A were married to each other in Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R. 88). 
19. At the time of his marriage to S H E R Y L 
R A E and at all times thereafter, M A R T I C O R E N A 
acknowledged the child as being his own and lived with 
him as his father (R. 89). 
20. Approximately September of 1972, S H E R Y L 
R A E M A R T I C O R E N A and SERGIO A. M A R T I -
CORENA moved their residence to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and contacted attorney Grant Aadnesen with re-
gard to MARTICORENA's legally adopting the 
child. 
21. S H E R Y L R A E ( M I L L E R ) M A R T I -
CORENA and S E R G I O A. M A R T I C O R E N A re-
mained together as husband and wife with the child, 
Michael, until October 20, 1973, when S H E R Y L 
R A E ( M I L L E R ) M A R T I C O R E N A was killed in-
stantly in an automobile accident near Winnemucca, 
Nevada (R. 90). 
22. On October 26, 1973, the plaintiff, R I C H -
A R D W. M I L L E R (the first husband of the de-
ceased defendant) joined SERGIO A. MARTICOR-
E N A (the second husband of the deceased defendant) 
as third-party defendant and served him with an Order 
to Show Cause why the child should not be delivered 
6 
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to him ( M I L L E R ) ; why M I L L E R should not be 
awarded permanent care, custody and control of the 
child, and why the Decree of Divorce should not be 
amended accordingly (R. 14). 
23. On October 31, 1973, the plaintiff's Motion 
and Order to Show Cause came on before the Family 
Courts Division of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Honorable James S. S away a, District Judge, presid-
ing. The plaintiff was represented by his present at-
torney, Brant H . Wall, Esq., and the defendant MAR-
T I C O R E N A was represented by Grant Aadnesen, 
Esq. of Salt Lake City, Utah. The Court did not take 
testimony or hear evidence at that time, but ordered 
both parties and the child to submit to a blood test in 
order to determine paternity, and further ordered the 
child be placed in the temporary custody of the ma-
ternal grandparents until the matter was finally re-
solved. (R. 16, 17,19). 
24. On November 13, 1973, Dr. Stanley Gibbon 
concluded and delivered the results of his blood type 
analysis to counsel for the parties, showing that neither 
husband could be excluded as the natural biological 
father of the child (Exhibit D-2) (R. 127). 
25. On February 6, 1974, the plaintiff's Motion 
and Order to Show Cause came on again for hearing 
before the Family Courts Division, this time before the 
Honorable Peter F . Leary, District Judge, presiding. 
The plaintiff was represented by Brant H . Wall, Esq. 
and the defendant was again represented by Grant 
Aadnesen, Esq. (R.25). 
7 
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26. The trial court afforded a brief hearing to the 
parties and at the close of the evidence, ruling from the 
bench, granted relief to the plaintiff as prayed (R. 25). 
I t is from this hearing and the final Order that the 
third-party defendant M A R T I C O R E N A assigns 
error and seeks equitable review of both the law and 
the facts and requests the matter be remanded to the 
trial court for rehearing. 
27. The third-party defendant SERGIO A. 
M A R T I C O R E N A has subsequently changed at-
torneys, and engaged the services of Robert D. Maack, 
Attorney at Law, to represent him on this appeal. (R. 
62). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E N A T U R A L P A R E N T H A S T H E 
P R I M A R Y , S U P R E M E A N D P A R A M O U N T 
R I G H T A G A I N S T A L L T H E W O R L D TO 
R E A R A N D N U R T U R E H I S OWN N A T U R A L 
O F F S P R I N G . 
The case at bar presents the anomalous situation 
of two sequential husbands of the same woman attempt-
ing to prove their paternity and obtain permanent cus-
tody of the only child born by her. In that regard, the 
action may be considered an inverse paternity suit. 
Although the form of the action is one of child 
custody, the turnkey issue is the true identity of the 
natural and biological father, as it cannot be disputed 
8 
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that one of the most universal, fundamental and axio-
matic concepts of all primitive, Roman, canon, common, 
civil, natural and constitutional law is that a natural 
parent has a supreme and paramount right against the 
entire world to rear and nurture his natural offspring 
so long as he is competent to care for and suitable to 
take charge of the child. State of Utah in the Interests 
of M., 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013, 45 A L R 3d 206 
(1970) ; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 
31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972); see also, 37 A L R 2d 882 
Annotation; superseded by 45 A L R 3d 216, 227, §4(b). 
P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N R E F U S -
I N G TO R E C E I V E , A D M I T A N D C O N S I D E R 
V I R T U A L L Y E V E R Y I T E M O F E V I D E N C E 
O F F E R E D BY T H E T H I R D - P A R T Y D E -
F E N D A N T TO PROVE H I S CASE. 
At the hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, 
the third-party defendant, M A R T I C O R E N A , at-
tempted to introduce evidence and testimony with re-
spect to the true paternity of the child. The trial court 
however, refused to allow such evidence and testimony 
for a variety of reasons, all of which the appellant con-
tends were and are legally erroneous. 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Testimony 
by Dr. Donald M. Kirk, M.D. with Respect to the Date 
of the Mother's Conception and Pregnancy. 
9 
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At pages 125 through 127 of the transcript of the 
proceedings on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, the 
appellant attempted to introduce testimonial evidence 
by the mother's obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr. Donald 
M. Kirk, M.D., to show, inter alia, the dates upon which 
she visited Dr. Kirk and definitely established the fact 
of her pregnancy, and that she later delivered on sched-
ule (R. 126). The proffer of evidence to the Court 
demonstrated that as early as August 16, 1969, the 
mother of the child visited Dr. Kirk and learned of 
her pregnancy (R. 126). This was a significant and 
crucial point, as the plaintiff M I L L E R had already 
testified that he did not take emergency leave from Ft . 
Gordon, Georgia and come to California until the third 
week of August, 1969, which date was after the de-
fendant S H E R Y L R A E ( M I L L E R ) M A R T I -
CORENA had already learned of her pregnancy.1 
In addition to the medical facts with regard to 
which Dr. Kirk was prepared to testify, he also was 
to testify with respect to statements made by the mother 
to him with bearing upon the paternity of the child,2 
which were made on August 16, 1969 and September 
2, 1969, in the presence of Dr. Kirk and in the presence 
of his nurse (R. 86, 103), who was also present and 
available to testify, although no proffer was made of 
1 The physician's testimony directly corresponds and corrobor-
ates the testimony of MARTICORENA at R. 99, where he testi-
fied that SHERYL RAE had told him of her pregnancy before 
MILLER came to California. 
2 Whether the statements are excludable under Lord Mansfield's 
Rule is discussed in full at Point III, infra, at p. 28. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
her testimony after Dr. Kirk's testimony was excluded. 
(R. 86,125, 126). 
The trial court excluded the testimonies of Dr. 
Kirk and his nurse as to date of pregnancy and pa-
ternity on three separate grounds: 
1. Hearsay; 
2. Inconsistency with the prior Divorce Decree; 
and 
3. As being a self-serving statement (R. 126). 
1. Hearsay: 
(a) The testimony of Dr. Kirk regarding the date 
of the mother's pregnancy was not testimonial in nature, 
but were statements of existing fact within the phys-
ician's personal knowledge (i.e., bodily condition on a 
date certain); therefore, the Court's holding of hearsay 
could not reasonably have been meant to apply to the 
doctor's statements regarding his knowledge of when 
pregnancy was first ascertained. 
(b) Statements made by the mother bearing upon 
paternity of the child fall directly under an exception 
to the Hearsay Rule and were specifically admissible 
under the old case law and under the new U T A H RULES 
OF EVIDENCE which were cited to the Court by counsel 
for the appellant (R. 95). 
At page 95 of the transcript, counsel for the ap-
pellant cited to the Court all the language of Rules 63 
(23) & (24) in their entirety for the purpose of show-
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ing such testimony was not excludable pursuant to a 
hearsay objection. Exception (24) to Hearsay Rule 63 
provides as follows: 
A statement concerning the birth, marriage, di-
vorce, death, legitimacy, race-ancestry, relation-
ship by blood or marriage or other similar fact of 
the family history of a person other than the de-
clarant if the judge (a) finds that the declarant 
was related to the other by blood or marriage or 
finds that he was otherwise so intimately associ-
ated with the other's family as to be likely to 
have accurate information concerning the mat-
ter declared, and made the statement as upon 
information received from the other or from a 
person related by blood or marriage to the other, 
or upon a repute in the other's family, and (b) 
finds that the declarant is unavailable as a wit-
ness ; . . . [Emphasis added]. 
UTAH: RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 63 (24) 
Certainly the case at bar fails squarely within the 
Subsection (24) exception to Hearsay Rule 63, and de-
pending upon the character of the statement, the only 
objection must go to weight and not to admissibility of 
the evidence. The language of the case In Re Lewis 
Estate cited to the trial court by plaintiff's counsel at 
the time of hearing only further buttresses the admiss-
ibility of the statements as an exception to the Hearsay 
Rule. See, In Re Lewis Estate, 121 Utah 385, 242 
P.2d 565 (1952), a case holding testimony far less re-
liable than that in the instant case to be specifically ad-
missible. See also, statements of plaintiff's counsel at 
(R. 96). The trial court had before it the Rule of Evi-
12 
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dence and the law of the case and still excluded the evi-
dence on the basis of hearsay. 
2. Inconsistency with Prior Divorce Decree: 
(a) Obviously, Dr. Kirk's testimony regarding the 
date of S H E R Y L RAE's pregnancy could not be ex-
cludable as being inconsistent with the Divorce Decree, 
as no mention of the date of pregnancy was made in 
the Decree or in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Therefore, one must determine that the Court's 
statements regarding inconsistency with the Divorce 
Decree did not go to the admissibility of the doctor's 
testimony as to the date pregnancy was first definitely 
established. 
(b) The Court's ruling that the declarant's state-
ments were inconsistent with the Decree of Divorce 
belies three basic considerations: 
First, the Decree of Divorce was granted by de-
fault. The defendant mother S H E R Y L R A E merely 
signed an Appearance, Waiver and Consent to Default 
rather than contesting the divorce. She did not even 
appear at time of trial. A determination of the fact 
based upon failure to deny and default, because the de-
fendant elects not to contest a divorce, is tenuous 
grounds indeed upon which to place much reliance. See 
Almeida v. Correct, 465 P.2d 564 (1970), where the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii refused to admit a previous 
Decree of Divorce as evidence of paternity in a subse-
quent action.3 
3 See also Nulman v. Cooper 120 Colo. 98, 207 P.2d 814 (1949); 
Combs v. Hodge 21 How. (U.S.) 397, 16 L.Ed. 115; 14 ALR 64, 
90 ALR 1402. 
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Second, the third-party defendant MARTICOR-
E N A was not a party to the former action (MILL-
E R v. M I L L E R , Docket 2993 (R. 1) ) , and cannot 
be barred by collateral estopple from relitigating the 
issue of paternity of the child. 
In Almeida v. Correa, supra, at page 571, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii in reviewing and remanding for 
new trial held: 
"A determination of the husband's non-paternity 
in the divorce proceedings was certainly not bind-
ing upon the defendant, who was not a party 
thereto, nor was it admissible as evidence by the 
petitioner in the present case. . . . 
The Divorce Decree, if it was relevant and ma-
terial at all, was admissible only for the purpose 
of establishing the mere fact of its own rendition 
and those legal consequences which result from 
\ that fact. I t should not have been used as affirm-
ative evidence against a stranger to the suit in 
which it was rendered to prove the existence of 
any fact underlying the Divorce Decree . . . such 
as the issue of paternity. [Id. at 571].4 
3. Self-Serving Statement: 
The third ground upon which Dr. Kirk and his 
nurse's testimonies were excluded was upon the ground 
of being self-serving. I t would seem that virtually all 
testimony offered in a lawsuit could be construed in a 
sense to be self-serving; however, the cases discussing 
the Rule of Evidence excluding self-serving statements 
4 See also cases cited at Footnote 3 supra p. 13. 
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clearly demonstrate that in order to be excluded as 
self-serving, the statement must be favorable or bene-
ficial to the declarant who stands to directly benefit 
from the statement. See State Road Commission v. 
Thompson, 17 Utah 2d 412, 413 P.2d 604 (1966); 
Sedam v. United States, 116 F.2d 80 (10th Cir., Utah 
1940). 
Without quarreling with the concept, it is difficult 
to understand how statements made to a physician re-
garding the date of a woman's pregnancy and paternity 
by a man who was not her husband while she was still 
married to her first husband could possibly be self-
serving for any purpose. Common sense would lead one 
to the opposite conclusion that such a statement would 
be a "declaration against interest" and admissible under 
that ground as well, as was urged upon the Court by 
counsel for the appellant at page 99 of the transcript. 
Finally, the statements made to Dr. Kirk regarding 
the date of pregnancy and the date they were made, in 
addition to being admissible under the two previously 
discussed exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,5 would also 
qualify to come in under Hearsay Rule Exception (12) 
(b) : statements made to the physician regarding the 
mother's symptoms and bodily condition. The testi-
mony of the doctor with respect to the date pregnancy 
was first discovered and the statements of the mother 
bearing upon the true paternity of the child were clearly 
improperly excluded. 
5 Rule 63(24) Statement Concerning Family History of Another: 
Rule 63(10) Declaration Against Interest. 
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2. Testimony Offered by the Second Husband 
and Third Party Defendant MARTICORENA Re-
garding the Period of Time During Which he Lived in 
Cohabitation with the Child's Mother Prior to and at 
the time of Her Conception and Pregnancy was Im-
properly Excluded as Being too Remote. 
In the transcript of the proceedings (beginning at 
Page 93 through 95), the appellant attempted to in-
troduce testimonial evidence with respect to the period 
of time the child's mother was living in cohabitation 
with him in California, and of his knowledge of non-
access to the mother by the respondent, M I L L E R , who 
was then living in Georgia during the very time which 
was critical in determining the time of conception and 
the identity of the siring husband. I t is submitted that 
the period of gestation, the living arrangements of the 
mother during the summer of 1969, and the relative 
access of the respective parties, was highly relevant, 
material and, in fact, critical in a realistic determination 
of true paternity. See Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal. App. 
2d 15, 122 P.2d 308, 310 (1942) (for discussion and 
legal authority pertaining to access and periods of 
gestation); cited with approval in Holder v. Holder, 
9 Utah 2d 163, 350 P.2d 761, 765 (1959). 
The fact that the first husband, M I L L E R , was 
living 3,000 miles away in Georgia and the mother was 
living in California during the time of conception has 
been held to be sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
the husband as being the natural father in most other 
states which, like Utah, subscribe to the beyond reason-
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able doubt standard of proof in rebutting the presump-
tion of legitimacy. For example, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia held in Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 1551, 56 
Am Dec. 451: 
Where the husband and wife reside at a distance 
from each other, so as to exclude the possibility 
of sexual intercourse, there it is admitted that the 
presumption of legitimacy is at once rebutted. 
I t is clear that the Court's evidentiary ruling ex-
cluding testimony on the fact of non-access by the first 
husband, M I L L E R , and access by the second husband, 
MARTICORENA, at the time of conception is not 
only legal error, but contrary to logic and common 
sense, 
3. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Allow 
Appellant's Counsel to Examine the Plaintiff, MILL-
ER, Regarding his own Knowledge and of Statements 
by the Child's Mother With Respect to Paternity. 
Beginning at page 116 through 118 of the trans-
cript, counsel for the appellant attempted to examine 
the plaintiff, M I L L E R , with regard to his knowledge 
of the true paternity of the child and with respect to 
statements made by S H E R Y L R A E to M I L L E R 
regarding her becoming pregnant by the appellant (R. 
116). The trial court disallowed this testimony on two 
grounds: 
1. Marital privilege — confidential communica-
tions (R. 117). 
17 
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2. Inconsistency with prior Divorce Decree (R. 
118). 
Marital Privilege: 
The point of evidence is controlled by statute, 
Rules of Evidence and Utah case authority. Section 
78-24-8(1), U T A H CODE ANNOTATED, (1953) and Rule 
28 of the U T A H RULES OF EVIDENCE, Section 78-24-8 
provides in part that: 
Neither a husband or wife can "either during the 
marriage or afterwards be . . . examined as to 
any communications made by one to the other 
during the marriage." (See Section 78-24-8(1), 
U.C.A. (1953). 
The definitive case in Utah on the question of 
marital privilege and confidential communication is 
State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946). 
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court per Justice Mc-
Donough held that the statute prohibited a spouse from 
testifying only with respect to "confidential communi-
cations". At page 737, of 175 P.2d, the Court stated: 
"I t is stated that the 'communication' between 
husband and wife contemplated by said statute 
consists of those communications and knowledge 
which are confidential in character . . . Such re-
marks were to be and were discussed with third 
parties. Consequently, it could not be deemed 
confidential." Id. 
The Court in holding non-confidential statements 
between spouses to be admissible evidence cited In Re 
Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac. 15 (1927). (A 
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case standing directly for the proposition cited above, 
that in order to be privileged and therefore inadmiss-
ible under the statute, the communication must be con-
fidential in character). The Utah cases have been re-
cently followed with approval by sister states. See 
STATE v. CHAFF IN 92 Idaho 629, 448 P.2d 243 
(1968). The requirement of "confidentiality" is un-
questionably the general as well as the Utah rule on 
the point. See for example: LEEMHUIS v. LEEM-
HUIS, 137 C.A. 2d 117, 289 P.2d 852 (1955); 
THOMPSON v. STEINKAMP, 120 Mont. 475, 187 
P.2d 1018 (1947); HILL v. HILL, 202 Okl. 483, 
215 P.2d 553 (1949); STATE v. THORNE, 43 
Wash. 2d 47, 260 P2d 331 (1953). 
Accordingly, the recently adopted UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE incorporated the requirement into the body 
of R U L E 28, as it provides in part: 
MARITAL PRIVILEGE - CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
[A spouse may] . . . refuse to disclose and pre-
vent the other from disclosing communications 
found by the judge to have been had or made 
in confidence between them while husband and 
wife. Id. Rule 28 U.R.E. 
In view of the fact that S H E R Y L R A E told at 
least four other witnesses6 present at the trial that the 
appellant was the father of her son, both during the 
pregnancy and afterward, and both during the marriage 
and afterward; it cannot seriously be contended that her 
6 See Testimony of Bishop Robert Charles Meyer, (R. 129-132); 
Proffer of testimony of Dr. Donald Kirk and Nurse (R. 125); 
Testimony of Sergio A. Marticorena (R. 95). 
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communications regarding becoming pregnant by the 
appellant while the plaintiff was in the state of Georgia 
was a confidential communication. The refusal by the 
trial court to allow appellant's counsel to examine the 
plaintiff with respect to his knowledge of the true pa-
ternity of the child and statements made by the child's 
mother was clear error. 
Inconsistency with prior divorce decree. The court's 
exclusionary ruling on grounds of inconsistency with 
a prior Decree of Divorce has been discussed at Point 
I, 2 above, and will not be recounted here. 
4. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Admit 
Written Documents in the Mother's Own Handwriting 
Declaring the Appellant to be the True Father of the 
Child. 
Beginning at page 99 of the transcript, counsel for 
the appellant attempted to offer a dated letter (Ex. 
D-l ) in the handwriting of the deceased mother, ad-
dressed, mailed and received in the mails by the appel-
lant. Although appellant's counsel went to great 
lengths to lay the appropriate foundation (R. 99, 100, 
101) the court sustained an objection to admissibility 
on the following grounds: 
(1) That it was hearsay, 
(2) That it was not the best evidence, 
(3) No foundation, 
(4) As being incompetent, irrelevant and im-
material. (R. 100,101). 
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The Exhibit n ^ N reoffered at (R. 128) 
and rejected. 
I t is, of course, appellant > contention that the hand-
written letter was admissible evidence. Examining the 
court's grounds for exclusion, it is not clear specifically 
which objection the court sustained in excluding the 
written document. Examining each objection in order: 
fj-. <trsatf (>bj rtiui, 
The hearsay objections to the mother's statements 
are controlled by Rule 63 (24) Statements Concerning 
Family History, U T A H R U L E S OF EVIDENCE and by 
the 1 tah ;MSI ui ? r . Lncts Estate, supra, and 
Midgley r. Denh alter supra, discuss* <I \.\ length at 
Poinl I I . " ;// !r. \W\< bn\'f ni l will not ht- n-argucd 
here. 
(2) Best Evidence Objection: 
The Best Evidence Rule lias been clarified and in-
^"•porated into the new Ti MI Hn,i-> 'W EVIDENCE at 
I P 7 0 . That K-;U pr.-vides u |>:.H: 
[A]s tending to prove the content of a writing, 
no other evidence other than the * -^;fWiLr 5+self is 
. . . issible. . . i-.. i u J e 70 U . R . E 
The document offered ( D - l ) was Hi< origin;^ letter 
sent h\ S I I F I O * ! H.W f- the appellant ^ni no 
iK; M)1).V u a s <>n"c-rt»*l Clearly the Best Evidence" 
Hule cannot h* \hr h.-i-e, ^f ?i1r , .illv\ ruling fnr ex-
clusion.7 
7 In fact the Plaintiffs objection cuts the other way. See discus-
sion of Best Evidence Rule with regard to letters 29 AM. JTTR, 
EVIDENCE, Section 473, Letters at p. 531 
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(3) No Foundation: 
The objection of No Foundation was merely dil-
atory and overzealous rhetoric on the part of Plaintiff's 
counsel as the record discloses two pages of Foundation 
(R. 99, 100, 101) amply sufficient to support intro-
duction of the document under Utah law. See: State 
of Utah v. Abram 27 Utah 2d 266, 495 P.2d 313 (1972) 
(a Utah case holding a foundation where the offeror, 
to whom it was addressed, received it in the regular 
course of the mails and it contained matters within their 
knowledge "supplying a connecting link" to be adequate 
foundation for its introduction.); See also State of 
Kansas v. Mulum 202 Kan. 196, 447 P.2d 801 (1968) 
(a case holding a foundation for a letter less adequate 
than the case before the court to be sufficient for ad-
mission and consideration). The letter (D-l) was later 
offered again near the end of the trial and similarly 
rejected (R. 128). The objection to foundation for 
the writing is ridiculous in light of the Record and the 
Utah Case of ABEAM. 
(4) Immaterial, Incompetent and Irrelevant. 
Here counsel for plaintiff used the old standard 
refrain which became platitudinous by the end of the 
hearing. With respect to being "immaterial and irrele-
vant" the objection is prima facia without merit as the 
substance of the letter and the point for which it was 
offered (vis., paternity of the child) was the very heart 
of the issue to be determined. 
The objection to the letter as being incompetent 
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also fails when recent U tah Case A i ithority is reviewed. 
1
- the recent paternity action STATE OF UTAH v. 
< iiRAM, 27, U tah 2d 266, 495 P.2d 313 (1972) (cited 
ra) the Utah Supreme Court in approving the com-
I tience and admissibility of a typewritten and unsigned 
letter addressed to and received by the prosecutrix held 
per Mr . Justice Tucket t : 
The contents of I he letter dealt with a numut. .:f 
facts which were the subject of conversations . . . 
The genuineness of a letter may be established 
as any other material fact by circumstantial evid-
ence. If the tenor of the letter and its subject 
matter supply a connecting link with other com-
munications between the purported sender and 
the addressee its admission is justified, [citing] 
9 A.L.R, 985; Jones on Evidence, Vol 3 Seeti< >n 
536. 
None of the ubjrchons citcu ;.\
 t.* iit.il I s eoun^ . 
tlu admissibility of the handwritten letter and sus-
tained In the Court were legallj sufficient to exclude 
the written evidence. 
5. Tin ("•////•/ Erred in Eoocludiny From Consider-
ation ///* /*'•.'. • 'I'df \)u Appellant Marticorena Paid 
the Doctor nid Hospital Bills fnr tht Birth -,f /''-, 
Child. 
Beginning at pnge ^ " (through 1flHv " ?V, 
transcript, counsel for the appellant attempt* o 
introduce evidence that the second husband Martieor-
ena had paid the doctor and hospital bills incurred by 
Sheryl Rae in connection with the birth of the child 
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even though Sheryl Rae was married to Miller at the 
time of the birth. Upon the objection by plaintiff's 
counsel that such fact was irrelevant, the court ruled 
that an inadequate foundation had been laid, whereupon 
counsel for the appellant laid a foundation in order for 
Doctor Kirk to testify as to the identity of the indi-
vidual who paid his medical fees for prenatal care and 
delivery of the child. Later in the hearing, however, the 
court disallowed testimony by the attending physician 
which was intended to connect up the preliminary testi-
mony as to payment of medical bills by Marticorena. 
(R. 126) I t is submitted that sufficient foundation had 
been laid for the introduction of appellant's testimony 
that he in fact did pay the medical and hospital ex-
penses incurred in connection with the birth of the child. 
6. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Admit 
or Consider Corroborating Statements Made by Sheryl 
Rae to Marticorena, Miller, Dr. Kirk, Dr. Kirk's 
Nurse, and Bishop Robert Meyer concerning the True 
Paternity of the Child. 
(1) At pages 95, 97, and 99 of the transcript, the 
Court refused to admit into evidence Marticorena's 
testimony that two or three weeks before Miller came 
to California from Georgia, Sheryl Rae informed him 
that she was pregnant. (R. 99) In excluding the evid-
ence, the Court stated that it was concerned with uncor-
roborated or "naked" statements about what the de-
fendant S H E R Y L R A E may have said . . ." (R. 97). 
However, later when the appellant attempted to in-
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troduce corroborating testimony, liic Court applied a 
different logic. 
jilt page lib Di Uic transcj.pt . ..vi. A. J. --> 
counsel attempted to elicit testimony from S H j h l i l L 
R A E ' s firs: husband. Miller, concerning statements 
she hn<! \utuU to him oncern ing Marticorena's being 
the father of the child. The Court held ;m\ such cor-
roborating testimony to be inadmissible as 5> folative of 
the Confidential Communications Retwc? r > nouses 
Hiilr. ' R . 118) 
(3) Dt Dt maid A, K irh :; 
A t page 126 of the transcript where the Court re-
ft ised to admit corroborating testimony of Dr . Donald 
A. Kirk, M.D. , the trial court reasoned that testi-
mony by Dr . Kirk concerning1 the date when pregnancy 
was first determined and statements made by 
_ E R Y L R A E to lu-r physician, were hearsay and 
inadmissible as conflicting with the prior Divorce De-
cree and/or self-serving. {1?. 12tt)-
(4) Dr. Kirk's Nurse : 
j n | . j i e transcript ai pagi 8<j, counsel for the ap-
pellant indicated to the Court that the nurse was pres-
ent and rc;id\ to It-siif\ (R. 86) . Marticorena testified 
that Dr . Kirk's nurse. "Reulah." w;is present during one 
of his visits to Dr . Kirk's office with S H E R Y L R A E 
and the child (R. 10*2. 10:^ and could have given cm 
roborating testimor* tJ wrvw. the Court for ;?]! 
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tents and purposes excluded the nurse's corroborating 
testimony at the same time it refused to admit the 
proffer as to Dr. Kirk. (R. 125,126). 
(5) Bishop Robert C.Meyer: 
Beginning at page 129 of the transcript appel-
lant's counsel attempted to introduce corroborating 
testimony by the L.D.S. Bishop, Robert C. Meyer, who 
performed the marriage of S H E R Y L R A E and 
SERGIO M A R T I C O R E N A and who had served on 
numerous occasions as their counselor and advisor (R. 
131). Bishop Meyer was present and prepared to 
testify with respect to lengthy discussions he had had 
with the child's mother regarding Miller, Marticorena, 
and the paternity of the child Michael. The Court, 
however, ruled the testimony to be improper as hearsay 
and the court sustained an objection to its introduction 
"on the same basis as the objection to Dr. Kirk's testi-
mony:' (R. 132). 
SUMMARY 
I t cannot be disputed that the testimony offered by 
the witnesses called by the Appellant meets the Rule 
63 (24) U.R.E. Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Like-
wise, a prior Divorce Decree cannot be conclusive 
against a stranger to the former action. The court's 
reasoning that the communication between S H E R Y L 
R A E and Miller regarding paternity was "confiden-
tial" and therefore privileged, fails by the sheer num-
bers of people in whom the mother confided. Finally, 
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: ' ' Court's ruling tl-.il {:• statements made ^} 
E R Y L R A E that she was pregnant b\ mother 
i, not her husband. whiie still married to her first 
!>and constituted a self-serving declaration is totally 
jfical. Such statements indicate the declarant to be 
6,.«;ty of a felony. Moreover, such statements would 
tend to hold the declarant u !"<,r ridicule and social 
disapproval find v,nidd provide grounds for an action 
sounding in libel per vr if tittered by a third party for 
imputing unchastity to a married woman. The state-
ments, if anything, were Declarations Against Interest 
and should have been specifically admitted and con-
sidered under Rule 63(10) . 8 As a consequence of the 
Court's evidentiary rulings, the Appellant. SRR{*10 
M A R T I C O R K X . N second husband of the 
ceased Defendant S H E R Y I 1? W M U m c o l t -
E N A , not only was prohibited from testifying himself 
because his statements were uncorroborated, hut was 
prevented from introducing other evidence and corrob-
orating testimony in order to support his testimony and 
otherwise prove h«s case. The trial et.-urfs evidentiary 
rulings constitute gross legal error, were extremely pre-
judicial to his cause and cannot be allowed to stand. 
8 Rule 63 (10) "Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows: Dec-
larations Against Interest. Subject to the limitations of excep-
tion (6), a statement which the judge finds was made by a 
declarant who is unavailable as a witness and which was at 
the time of the assertion so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far subjected him to 
civil or criminal liability or so far rendered invalid a claim by 
him against another or created such risk of making him an 
object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval that the declar-
ant under the circumstances existing would not have made the 
statement unless he believed, it to be true; 
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P O I N T I I I 
L O R D M A N S F I E L D ' S R U L E H A S NO A P -
P L I C A T I O N TO T H E CASE A T BAR. 
At the outset of his argument the Appellant rec-
ognized the existence and application of L O R D 
M A N S F I E L D ' S R U L E as recently enunciated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 
2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974). Although the Trial 
Court did not exclude any evidence offered by the Ap-
pellant on the basis of L O R D M A N S F I E L D ' S 
R U L E , the Plaintiff, Miller, (who in prosecuting his 
case did not introduce any evidence or offer any testi-
mony) stood upon the presumption that a child born 
during wedlock is the legitimate offspring of the mother 
and her then husband. Because the court has recently 
expressed that closely related to this presumption of 
legitimacy is the limitation on the method of proof of 
non-paternity,9 the appellant deems it necessary to 
distinguish this case from one in which Lord Mans-
field's Rule might reasonably apply. 
1. The Child Cannot Possibly Be Illegitimatized. 
Lord Mansfield's Rule, which was most recently 
approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Lopes v. 
Lopes, supra, is described as follows: 
Closely related to the presumption that a child 
born during wedlock is the legitimate offspring 
to herself and her husband is the limitation on 
the method of proof of non-paternity: That the 
9 See Lopes v. Lopes 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) at 
page 689 P.2d. 
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spouses themselves ma\ nut give testimony which 
would tend to illegitimatize the child. This is 
known as the Lord Mansfield's Rule. I t s genesis 
and wide acceptance arise out of the same con-
siderations as the presumption of legitimacy: 
The importance of the integrity of the family; 
and the policy of giving the interests and welfare 
of children priority over those of warring adults. 
Id at p . 689 P2d. 
Section 77-liO-lJj Utah Code Annotated (1953) j: m i 
vides in pa r t : 
MARRIAGE OF PARTIES LEGITIMIZES L I I I L . , 11 
the mnlh'-r <•(' an; such child and the father shall 
at any time after its birth intermarry, the child 
shall in all ""sprct«, he deemed tr h- Vmfi 
mate, 
See also, In lie Lewis iilsiaic, 11:1 c i a h '4&J 2lz r .«u 
565 (1952) where Justice Wade speaking for the Court 
held: '"Tin wording of [The statute] i- clear and ex-
plicit and unambiguous. I t provides that if the father 
and the mother of the illegitimate child intermarry at 
any time after its birth 'The child shall in all respects 
be deemed to be legitimate.' Tlvi-c •<••** no conditions 
attached to such legitimation.'' 
Id.. / *; > .-wis !'.«t,t •; , . :U;H P.2d, 
Moreov er, Sec tion • ? • l : > m v i d es a s 
follow -; 
ADOPTiIKS r>> .IUV.NWWI.KIX AIKM. 1 IIC iacner 
of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledg-
ing it as his <»\\n receiving it ih such with the 
consent of h's *< if if he is man••< <j' i !r- fam-
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ily, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legiti-
mate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such 
child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the time of its birth. . . . 
See also Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 P.2d 
35 (1967) "A child was born to the parties in April 
of 1951 and has been reared by the parties and ack-
nowledged by the [father] as his child. Hence, the child 
is his legitimate child by adoption, pursuant to Sec-
tion 78-30-12 U.C.A. (1953)." See In Re Garr's 
Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 Pac. 757. 
From the above-cited statute and Utah case auth-
ority, it is clear that, by virtue of the marriage between 
S H E R Y L R A E and SERGIO M A R T I C O R E N A , 
together with Marticorena's subsequent acknowledg-
ment of the child as his own, the child Michael, regard-
less of his true paternity, would be legitimate from the 
time of his birth and the testimony of the mother can-
not possibly tend to illegitimatize him. 
2. The Policy Reasons for Lord Mansfield's Rule 
Do Not Apply to the Mother's Testimony. 
As the mother's statements bearing upon the true 
paternity of the child to M A R T I C O R E N A , M I L L -
ER, DR. KIRK, DR. KIRK's N U R S E , Beulah, 
and B I S H O P R O B E R T C H A R L E S M E Y E R can-
not "tend to illegitimize the child," they are and must 
be specifically admissible to aid the court in its search 
for the truth. Lord Mansfield's Rule of Law as an-
nounced in Lopes v. Lopes, supra, cannot and should 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no t be blindly applied i.- -, l
 a travesty against the 
appellant. Perhaps the best argument that van he ad-
vanced on the point i* a quotation from the pen of Mr. 
Justice Crockett. In writing the Lopes decision at 
footnote 6 he explained why Lord Mansfield's Bilie 
was an exception to Rule 7 LT.R.E. as follows: 
.Aj mk I-, a general Mahineni of pnlic\ inau^ 
without focus upon the particular problem lure 
involved. Such generality should not be deemed 
to control in a specific situation where its effect 
would be to distort justice by subverting such a 
sound and well-established rule as that under 
consideration here. The parties affected, and the 
principle of law involved, are entitled to be con-
sidered upon their owTn merits as to reason, jus-
tier and policy. . . . I t would of course be pre-
sumptuous to suppose that this is the final word 
to be said upon the law of evidence, 
It JS submitted the same reasoning applies against the 
application *A Lord Mansfield's Rule to the case be-
fore the Court. 
P O I N T IV 
iJJLl i , ±JLJIiAltJLAl. H i \ I U t m , L 
COURT ON P L A I N T I F F S O.u, . H TO hxiuw 
CAUSK WAS FUNDAMENTALLY A VD IN-
HERENTLY ( XFAIR, UNJUST AND IN-
EQUITAKLF. 1)11) NOT DO SUBSTANTIAL 
JUSTICE AND 1)1 PHIVLI) THE APPEL-
LANT OF THE l )n< PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECT Ol '! HE LAW 
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From only a cursory examination of the transcript 
of the proceedings (less than 50 pages in length), one 
senses a general impression that the case was not well 
tried or fully heard, and that many of the crucial facts 
and much important information was summarily sup-
pressed. For example: when counsel for the appellant 
in attempting to develop the critical chronological order 
of events prior to the mother's conception in the sum-
mer of 1969, in order to demonstrate the period of non-
access by M I L L E R and access by MARTICOR-
ENA, the court cut off such examination as being "too 
remote". (R. 93) Later, when the appellant attempted 
to introduce testimony as to the date when the doctor 
first definitely established the fact that S H E R Y L 
R A E was pregnant, the Court excluded that testimony 
on grounds that were never made clear (R. 126). More-
over, the Court seemed reluctant to give appropriate 
consideration to certain facts that the appellant did 
manage to get into evidence (i.e., at page 99 of the 
transcript the Court stated: "Not going into that, I 
don't see that the fact that she may have been pregnant 
in the summer of 1969 goes and has any weight to it 
particularly"). The conclusion seems strange, in light 
of the fact that the plaintiff had been residing away 
from the child's mother in the State of Georgia since 
May 22,1969. (R. 116). 
' . . "i 
In contrast, however, the Court took judicial notice 
of a Default Divorce Decree and excluded most of the 
appellant's proffered evidence on that basis even 
though the appellant was never a party to that action 
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(R. 120). Tlu- Court sau no relevance in the fact that 
the appellant M A R T I C O R E N A paid the doctor and 
hospital hills incurred in connection w ith the birth of 
the child < R. 24), but saw all statements made and 
letters written by the child's mother indicating that she 
was pregnant by another man while still married to her 
first husband, as self-serving rather than against her 
interests (R. 97 ,127,132) . 
Perhaps the IHOMI striking *a:3 the line ui tp- * • 
ing that the Court found io be material beginning m 
page 109 of the transcript. There the Court, over the 
objection of the appellant^ m u n ^ I . «'!<*••*.'* *:-unsr1 
for the plaintiff to delve into such pertinent issues as 
llv third par ty defendant's place1 of birth, the location 
oi a prior marriage, his citizenship, where he obtained 
a divorce, the present address of his former wife an<l 
•other surf) vital information. (R , IK > : . 
The app« Jianl <ioes not suggest that the summary 
manner in whirls the hearing was conducted was int< n 
lional :• M = - .•;»:! • »' w:t pa i-*y thereto, but onh ^ 
the proceedings as a whole were cursory, superficial and 
not legally sufficient to finally determine an issue of the 
magnitude presented. The trial court then, and the Ap-
pelate Court nowr on review is faced with one of the most 
important, precious and fundamental rights known to 
man: The right to have and r< a'- a man ^ own son I 
fait that the outcome of thi> case will - *'*. > nK \wa 
or three individuals, and does not contain far-reaching 
social ramifications affecting hundreds or thousands of 
the state's citizens, 0 " i . ; u !••"•• n<^ bearing upon the 
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quality and quantity of the Court's examination and 
consideration. 
I t is submitted the trial court's determination was 
too cursory and superficial, both in its evidentiary rul-
ings and in the amount of attention afforded to the 
litigants in one small child custody case to constitute 
the due process of law and equal protection required 
by the Constitution. 
P O I N T V 
I N D E P E N D E N T S C I E N T I F I C E V I D E N C E 
E X I S T S A N D IS A V A I L A B L E TO A I D T H E 
COURT I N E S T A B L I S H I N G T R U E PA-
T E R N I T Y A N D T H E A P P E L L A N T R E -
Q U E S T S T H E C O U R T S I M P R I M A T U R ON 
T H E P O I N T . 
Although the blood type analysis by Dr. Gibbon 
failed to exclude either husband as the true father of 
the child, (R. 127 and Exhibit D-2) both the appellant 
and respondent had in attendance expert witnesses 
learned in the science of genetics and prepared to testi-
fy: Dr. Charles Scott and Dr. Wilmer C. Wiser. (R. 
128). What their testimony would have been was dis-
cussed off the record in the trial court and therefore 
cannot be considered by the Appellate Court on review. 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 384 
P.2d 109 (1963); Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity 
and Guaranty Insurance Co., 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 
135 (1963). 
However, the trial court was concerned with the 
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admissibility of such evidence :mu requested authority 
fiu the point which was provided ; R. ' - I n light of 
the Court 's pronouncements in Lopes v. l*t>pr& (supra) 
where the Court stated i 
When a new trial or further proceeding is or-
dered, it is our duty to pass upon questions of 
law which may be pertinent and helpful in arriv-
al c; at n final determination of the case, Id. 
.•liquid flu- ». • uiH determine f!:;it r< hearing on the 
matter is appropriate the Appellant pursuant to Rule 
76(a) U .R .C .P . and in accordance with the Kulr -
nounced in Johnson v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 200, 4JO 
P . 2d 615 (1966), reaffirmed in Lopes, requests the 
court's imprimatiit on the admissibility of genetic c a -
dence as to the biological possibilities of inheriting cer-
tain genotypic and phcnotypic characteristics and as to 
the mathematical and statistical probabilities of the 
child's ability io inherit certain characteristics **--:r 
either of the reputed fathers as fully discussed .n .: 
meida v. Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1070) : 
People in ?J In ICrests •>/' S., 51 '* d ?72 i Colo. 
1973). See, Utah r. Anderson, 63 Utah 121, 224 Pac. 
442, 40 A L R 94 (1924); 55 A L E 3d 1087 Annota-
tion', 5 F A M I L Y L A W QUARTERLY 252, Krause. Scien-
tific Evidence, and the Ascertainment of Paternity 
(1971); See also, The discussion beginning at page 78 
of the record in the instant case. 
The case at oar presents the Court with the unique 
problem of two men Mttrrrptincr to vvovc their oaternity 
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of a young child which both of whom have lived with, 
cared for and nurtured. Despite the crushing burden 
of proof10 placed upon the third-party defendant-ap-
pellant on review, he stands ready, willing and able to 
undertake the task. 
The brief hearing afforded to the appellant in the 
trial court was replete with legal error and effectively 
prevented the appellant from introducing virtually 
every piece of evidence offered in his behalf. 
Clearly, the cumulative effect of the suppression of 
admissable and highly probative evidence denied the ap-
pellant his day in court and thereby of the due process 
the law affords. The right with which the Court is here 
concerned dates back long before the Magna Carta and 
is fundamental to any well-ordered and free society. I t 
is described in the Declaration of Independence and 
guaranteed by the Constitution. I t cannot be that such 
a right can be extinguished in a summary manner with-
out fully examining and considering the evidence in 
order to intelligently determine the issues. 
The appellant urges the court on this equitable re-
view to examine both the law and facts, remand the case 
for a full hearing with instructions to consider all com-
petent and legally admissible evidence together with the 
court's imprimatur concerning what other independent 
scientific evidence may be considered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R O B E R T D. MAACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 Beyond Reasonable Doubt. See Lopes v. Lopes (supra). 
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